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Positive claims about narrative approaches to healthcare suggest they could have 
many benefits, including supporting person-centred healthcare (PCH). Narrative 
approaches have also been criticised, however, on both theoretical and practical 
grounds. In this paper we draw on epistemological work on narrative and knowledge 
to develop a conception of narrative that responds to these concerns. We make a 
case for understanding narratives as accounts of events in which the way each event 
is described is influenced by the ways other events in the narrative are described. 
This view of narratives recognises that they can contribute knowledge of different 
kinds of connections between events: not just causal, and not just of patient’s 
perspectives. Additionally, narratives can add further epistemic value by suggesting 
potentially useful lines of inquiry. We take narrative approaches to healthcare to 
include clinicians considering both patients’ informational offerings and their own 
professional understandings as narratives. On this understanding, our account is able 
to overcome the major theoretical and practical criticisms that have been levelled 
against the use of narrative approaches in healthcare, and can help to explain why 
and how narrative approaches are consistent with PCH. 
 
Several authors have argued that that clinical attention to narratives – that is, listening to 
the narratives of patients in the clinical encounter and/or recognising narrative structures in 
medical knowledge – can improve patient care in a number of ways. Many of the claims 
made about the benefits of attending to narratives overlap with features of person-centred 
healthcare (PCH). As such, narrative approaches (as we will refer to them) can be considered 
potential means of supporting PCH.  
 
PCH has been formulated in a range of ways, but loosely, aims to counter problems in 
healthcare related to tendencies to reductive and dehumanising care of patients. These 
tendencies have been linked to the enduring influence of the biomedical model 




increasing emphasis on technologies [3;4;5]); and constraints in clinical practice, such as 
financial, time, and institutional pressures, that (allegedly) limit clinicians’ capacities to 
engage with patients as persons.1 These influences and pressures can lead to healthcare 
that is disease-centred, clinician/system-centred, or technology/measurement-centred, with 
negative impacts on patients [6, p.29]. In contrast, PCH can be understood as involving: 
treating patients as persons worthy of respect and compassion; recognising and responding 
to patients’ subjective experiences of illness and care, and concerns about their identities 
and life projects; and developing therapeutic relationships that support (or at least do not 
undermine) patients’ abilities to  participate actively in their own healthcare (including to 
ensure their personal values influence treatment decision-making) [6, pp.34-36].2 
       
Some discussions of PCH claim that clinical attention to narratives can facilitate the 
achievement of PHC, while narrative approaches share many motivations with PHC. Like 
PHC, narrative approaches seek to recognise patients as individuals and avoid the 
homogenisation of patients’ experiences that can be associated with an overly biomedical 
emphasis [8]. Advocates of narrative approaches claim that they can: improve patient-
clinician communication, enabling clinicians to better understand patients’ situations and 
perspectives, and so more effectively communicate information to patients; allow patients 
to be heard empathically and develop understanding of the meaning of their experiences; 
and develop clinicians’ capacities for empathy and understanding. An additional claim is that 
recognising narrative structures inherent in medical knowledge can help counter tendencies 
to dehumanise patients and the biomedical assumptions thought to encourage those 
tendencies.  
 
Narrative approaches face theoretical and practical issues, both of which relate in part to 
how the concept of narrative is understood. One critique of narrative approaches is that the 
concept of narrative is so broad that it renders claims about attending to narratives trivial: if 
 
1 Throughout this paper we use ‘clinician’ to refer to any healthcare professional. For a detailed 
review of definitions of PCH see [6].   
2 PCH can additionally be understood to require that clinicians are treated as persons [6;7]. Here we 




every communication is narrative, the concept is emptied of specificity [9;10].3 Others argue 
that narrative is too narrow a concept to encompass the illness experience of all patients 
[11;12;1]. Practically, time constraints may prevent clinicians from listening to detailed 
narratives from every patient; not every patient may want depth of engagement in their 
narrative [13]; and sometimes there are reasons for clinicians to be wary of taking patients’ 
statements at face value.  
 
In this paper, we aim to clarify the potential contribution of clinical attention to narratives in 
achieving some of the aims of PCH. Specifically, we investigate what knowledge narratives 
can contribute, and use insights from this investigation to develop a pluralist account of the 
epistemic (and related ethical) value that narrative approaches can add in health care 
contexts. Our account supplements existing theoretical work in narrative approaches which 
focuses primarily on the role of narrative in developing ethical goods like empathy and 
practical reasoning [14;15, Ch.8]. 
    
In section 1, we review the claims of narrative approaches in relation to improving patient 
care. In section 2 we overview some critiques. In section 3 we develop our pluralist 
conception of narrative. In section 4, we show how this conception resolves the theoretical 
criticisms, and in section 5, identify the direction it provides in addressing practical issues. 
 
1. Narrative and the goals of PCH 
The concept of narrative is characterised diversely and sometimes quite broadly in 
descriptions of narrative approaches in healthcare. Montgomery Hunter states that by 
‘narrative’ she means “a more or less coherent written, spoken, or (by extension) enacted 
account of occurrences, whether historical or fictional” [16, p.306]. Greenhalgh and Hurwitz 
[17, pp.3-4] point to four typical features of narratives: narratives include events occurring 
sequentially over time; involve a narrator and a listener; are concerned with individuals and 
their perspectives; and involve us emotionally. Charon examines five features of narratives: 
narratives represent temporal relations between events; focus on particular events and 
agents; connect events both causally and contingently; are intersubjective in the sense that 
 
3 An even broader range of claims are in fact made for narrative than the one we identify here [9]. 




both clinicians’ and patients’ perspectives affect what narrative is told; and have ethical 
dimensions since they involve this intersubjective relationship [14, pp.40-56].  
 
In this section we overview four main claims of narrative approaches that are relevant for 
PCH, namely that: (1) clinical attention to patient narratives is a good way to obtain 
information that facilitates better care [17;18]; (2) narratives can help both patients and 
clinicians understand illness experiences [8;19]; (3) use of narrative approaches helps 
clinicians to develop listening skills and empathy [14]; and (4) recognition by clinicians of 
narrative structures in medical knowledge will help them avoid problematic tendencies 
associated with the biomedical model [14;15].  
 
The first claim, that in a particular clinical encounter, listening to a patient’s narrative 
provides information to the clinician, is unpacked in several ways and supported by a range 
of examples. Narrative information reportedly aids accurate diagnosis, informs 
interpretation of physical and laboratory findings, focuses diagnostic work-ups, and assists 
in choosing therapeutic options acceptable to and understood by the patient [14, p.9]. 
While some diagnoses can be made on the basis of physical signs, in many cases it is 
necessary to listen to accounts of symptoms and their contexts in order to distinguish likely 
causes, for example of epigastric pain or dizzy episodes. Similarly, understanding what 
treatments will be acceptable to and workable for a patient may require knowledge of her 
commitments, daily activities, and available resources, and not only her physical condition. 
The claim is not just that a clinician needs information about their patient for these 
purposes, but that allowing patients to provide the information in a narrative form is an 
epistemically and ethically advantageous way to acquire it, in contrast to other methods 
such as clinician-directed questioning. Allowing patients to provide information in narrative 
form is an efficient way to collect information of relevance to the patient’s condition, and 
contributes to relationship-building and other ethically-oriented goals as well as supporting 
better health outcomes. 
 
Second, listening to patients’ narratives can be itself a therapeutic act. It allows patients to 
be heard and to engage in practices of self-interpretation that can increase self-




who are struggling to make sense of their illness experience, whose illness has disrupted 
their life or sense of identity [8;20]. Listening to patient’s narratives is a way for clinicians to 
bear witness to patients’ suffering, be empathic, and establish a therapeutic relationship, all 
of which are important elements of the clinician’s ethical responsibilities [18, p.1899].  
 
Third, over time attending to patients’ narratives improves clinicians’ listening skills, which 
increases their capacities to gain knowledge from patient narratives and to fulfil these 
ethical responsibilities. Charon argues that listening to patient narratives (especially when 
combined with other practices like narrative writing) develops empathy, respectfulness, 
altruism, imagination, and interpretation [14, p.8-10]. Montgomery Hunter argues that 
attention to patient narratives can improve clinicians’ practical reasoning as it requires 
engagement with others’ perspectives [16, pp.307-8; pp.312-3;15, Ch. 8].  
 
Finally, the claim is made that clinical recognition of narrative structures in medical 
knowledge can help counter an overly biomedical perspective and the dehumanisation of 
patients thought to follow from it [10]. Kleinman’s detailed accounts of patients’ stories, for 
example, compellingly demonstrate that the meanings of illness are largely omitted by the 
biomedical perspective [19]. Montgomery Hunter and Charon provide theoretical 
arguments to underpin this point. Both distinguish, following Balint, between the patient’s 
illness narrative, and the medical narrative which the clinician creates, reinterpreting the 
events in pathophysiological terms along with other events such as clinical examinations 
and tests [14, p.22;15, Ch.1-2].4 
 
Clinicians are typically taught to regard medical understanding as objective and the patient’s 
as subjective [1]. While there are senses in which this is true, it can enforce a view that the 
medical understanding is the ‘correct’ one while the patient’s lacks validity. This can hamper 
communication, and seem to the patient a dismissal of their experience [15, p.13]. 
Regarding both clinicians’ and patients’ understandings as narratives implies that they are 
both interpretations, which represent different perspectives and have different purposes, 
but each can be valid. Clinicians interpret symptoms in the context of their medical 
 
4 We leave aside further distinctions, such as between the medical narrative told to the patient and 




knowledge and seek to fit them into a nosological pattern, while patients interpret 
symptoms within the context of other events in their lives [14, p.22]. Recognising this, it is 
claimed, can help shift clinicians’ focus beyond an overly biomedical one and avoid the kinds 
of devaluing of patient perspectives that hinder empathic engagement and therapeutic 
alliance, or lead to dangerous neglect of relevant information patients provide [15;21;22]. 
 
2. Critiques of narrative approaches 
These claims about narrative approaches further demonstrate the diversity in conceptions 
and forms of narrative. Across the spectrum, they include everything from brief, 
spontaneous patient statements, to literary narratives that present a rich, imaginatively 
challenging account of subjective experience. Charon talks of the patient’s narrative 
including not only their statements, but also clinical signs, lab results, and treatment 
responses, while other scholars include literary forms such as poetry in the category [15, 
p.305;17, p.13;11]. Sometimes ‘narrative’ seems to be used to refer to anything related to 
subjective experience or to the ‘human aspects’ of medicine [9, p.74;10]. If such a broad 
range of things count as narratives, it seems unclear whether ‘listening to a patient’s 
narrative’ means anything more than ‘listening to a patient’, or what it adds to consider 
empathy, recognition of perspective, and so on, as related to listening to narratives. 
 
At the same time, narrative approaches have been criticised on the ground that narrative is 
too narrow a concept to capture all possible illness experiences. This critique is often aimed 
at specific accounts that offer a narrow, more precise conception of either what counts as a 
narrative or of what counts as a beneficial narrative. We illustrate this using the work of 
Arthur Frank, who suggests that illness narratives tend to fall into three main categories – 
chaos, restitution, and quest – and implies that quest narratives are the preferable kind [8]. 
Frank is primarily focused on understanding illness experience, in situations where severe or 
long-lasting illness disrupts a person’s life or capacity to find meaning in their experiences, 
rather than the kind of minor matters that can also be found in everyday clinical 
consultations. Chaos narratives are ‘anti-narratives’ where narrative ordering is lost; 
restitution narratives have the form ‘I was once healthy, now I am sick, but I can be healthy 
again’; while quest narratives see illness experiences as transformative. Discussing chaos 




dealing with multiple family problems including caring for her mother who has Alzheimer’s. 
Her story involves a constant telling of the present moment with “no memorable past and 
no future worth anticipating”, because she is so occupied by the horror and difficulty of the 
present moment that narrative order cannot be imposed [8, p.99]. Although Frank 
emphasises the importance of chaos narratives being heard, he also indicates that it will be 
beneficial for them ultimately to be transcended [8, p.110]. Restitution narratives are 
encouraged by biomedical approaches and often by well-meaning clinicians, but according 
to Frank, a more authentic understanding of the meaning of illness is found through quest 
narratives [8, Ch.6]. Quest narratives interpret illness experiences as a journey from which 
something might be gained, and may help allow an ill person to fully own their experience in 
virtue of their activities of narration. An example is John Donne’s recasting of his critical 
illness as a spiritual journey [8, p.116]. Frank’s view implies narrower criteria for what will 
count as a narrative – since a description of chaos is on this view a loss of narrativity – and 
makes normative claims about what narratives are most beneficial.  
 
Narrow conceptions of narrative are potentially problematic in several respects. They 
potentially constrict rather than aid self-understanding and the struggle for meaning in 
illness, if they encourage some ways of interpreting experience over others [12;23]. They 
risk suppressing alternative kinds of self-understanding – and experiences of formlessness, 
meaninglessness, and silence – and may encourage self-deception [10]. They seem to imply 
that patients whose experiences do not exhibit the ‘quest’ form have somehow failed.  
 
Even conceptions of narrative (or ‘beneficial narrative’) that are broader than Frank’s are 
liable to the criticism of being too narrow. Conventions about narrative, or narrative form 
itself might constrain how patients and clinicians are permitted or encouraged to 
understand illness experiences, and prevent acknowledging experiences of chaos or 
meaninglessness [12;23]. Some patients indicate that non-narrative forms of self-
understanding are useful for them, for example those achieved through poetry or dance 
[24].  
  
The critique that narrative may be too narrow a concept through which to understand 




clinician’s interpretation of a patient’s situation as a narrative might also be constraining. If 
clinicians focus too much on finding the story that makes sense of the situation, they might 
risk getting ‘locked in’ to a particular narrative too early in the diagnostic process, focussing 
on confirming the expected diagnosis and ignoring or dismissing inconsistent details [15, 
p.17-19;17, p.8].  
 
Narrative approaches also face practical issues. One is the time constraints experienced by 
most clinicians [1;2;25]. David Morris reports a typical reaction from clinicians to his 
discussions about narrative approaches: “‘What you say about narrative is very interesting,’ 
I hear repeatedly. ‘Thanks so much for coming. But I have seven minutes per patient.’ End of 
story” [1, p.88]. Second, not all patients want to spend additional time or engage deeply 
with their clinician, and not every patient will need or want empathic understanding of their 
story in order to achieve their healthcare goals [1;13, p.84]. Third, while narrative 
approaches need to take patient statements seriously, there are cases where clinicians may 
be rightly wary of taking patient reports at face value. For example, patients’ claims about 
being happy to risk their health rather than alter their lifestyle might be rationalisations that 
obscure significant fears, while the veracity of reports about behaviours (including 
medication use) might be influenced by embarrassment or a desire to please the clinician 
[26, p.1463-4]. 
 
To evaluate these various critical concerns about narrative, we next examine narrative 
epistemologically. Any method of gathering knowledge, after all, will have strengths and 
weaknesses, and an epistemological understanding can help to identify the circumstances 
under which it is likely to be reliable, and when we might want to be cautious about its use. 
This is true no less of narratives than of randomised controlled trials. For instance, with 
randomised trials, we recognise that they can have strong internal but weak external 
validity, and where we judge that this is so, are cautious in applying their results to other 
populations. An epistemological account of narrative should similarly offer guidance on its 





3. Narratives and their contributions to knowledge   
Narratives describe events that are somehow connected and occur at different times.5 
These basic features are evident in the conceptions of narrative invoked by scholars on 
narrative approaches in healthcare. Assuming these basic features, we examine two ways of 
understanding how narratives could provide knowledge: (1) that they provide causal 
knowledge, and (2) that they provide knowledge about human actions and agency. We then 
argue for a pluralist view on which narratives are understood to convey knowledge of 
causes and/or knowledge of human action; and more generally, that they can add epistemic 
value by providing reasons to interpret events using particular descriptions and/or by 
informing judgements about the validity of different ways of interpreting events. 
 
Causal knowledge 
The idea that events in narratives are causally connected goes back to Aristotle [27, p.2], 
and suggests that the kind of knowledge we acquire from narratives may be causal. In the 
twentieth century, positivists claimed that knowledge from narratives must be causal [28]. 
This claim however, runs into the problem that many narratives include connections 
between events that are seemingly not causal. A classic example is a short narrative from 
Aristotle: "the statue of Mitys at Argos killed the author of Mitys' death by falling down on 
him when a looker-on at a public spectacle" [in 27, p.5]. In this example, the death of the 
murderer is not causally related to his murdering Mitys, yet most accept that this is a 
narrative connection. Another kind of example involves ‘teleological’ connections, where 
one event is understood in relation to another that is its goal; for instance, the connections 
between obtaining Flint’s treasure (the goal) and the events that lead up to it in Treasure 
Island. This kind of connection cannot be understood as solely causal: although some of the 
events in Treasure Island causally contribute to finding the treasure, other events are 
obstacles to this goal [27, pp.8-10]. They are understood in relation to the goal but as 
obstacles, not causes.  
 
Those who regard narratives as sources of causal knowledge typically argue that such non-
causal connections tend to be misleading. Currie argues that non-causal connections such as 
 
5 We follow the usual practice of using ‘events’ in a general way which includes psychological 




that in the Mitys story work by generating the illusion of a causal relation, into which the 
audience willingly enters, in recognition of apparent poetic justice in Mitys’ statue killing his 
murderer [29]. Velleman argues that narratives seem to us to explain events because they 
evoke familiar emotional sequences and so can make us think we understand some 
sequences of events when we do not [27]. Anxieties over the unscientific nature of 
narratives, connected to these non-causal connections, lead to claims that narratives are 
necessarily misleading or distort the truth. Since narratives are essentially interpretive – 
they depend on selection of which events to include, and present them in certain ways – 
narration involves imposing form onto events which in themselves have no such structure 
[30, p.5]. White, for example, takes the exclusion of some facts and the selection of others 
to be necessarily distorting, giving events certain meanings that they do not inherently 
possess [31].  
 
However, there are two main reasons to be dissatisfied with the view that the knowledge 
generated by narrative is exclusively or primarily causal. First, while narratives often include 
information about causal connections between events, they also often include other kinds 
of connections, that may nonetheless be knowledge conveying (as we discuss below). The 
causal view is too narrow as it excludes this possibility. Second, the view that narrative 
explanations reduce to causal explanations with some additional, potentially misleading 
elements simply writes narrative off as an epistemic tool, rather than helping us distinguish 
when it might be useful, and when it is likely to mislead. 
 
Knowledge about human action  
Other views of narrative and knowledge seek to explain what of epistemic value, other than 
causal knowledge, might be provided by narratives. Such views begin by distinguishing 
between causal explanations and explanations in terms of reasons for action, and regard 
narrative explanations to fall into the latter category [32;33;34]. Although a reason for 
action could be considered an event that causes an action as a second event, explanations in 
terms of reasons differ from causal explanations because they allow us to understand the 
agent’s decisions first-personally [32, p.128]. A reason for action will make sense only as 
part of a web of reasons, beliefs, and attitudes, in the context of which an agent decides, so 




have a distinctive role in understanding the meaning of events from particular perspectives 
[35, p.191].6 Some make a further claim that narrative is an apt form in which to provide 
reasons-based explanations because there are similarities between narrative structure and 
the structures of action and practical reasoning [36;33]. This view of what sort of knowledge 
narratives can provide seems consistent with many of the claims of narrative approaches in 
healthcare, explaining why narrative may be an apt form in which to examine illness 
experiences and their impact on self-understanding.7  
 
The view that narrative contributes to understandings of reasons for human action captures 
important points regarding the potential epistemic value of narrative: it suggests narratives 
enable articulation of the meaning of events from particular perspectives and provide 
insight into the meaning-making interpretive activities of individuals. But there are reasons 
to avoid understanding the epistemic value of narrative entirely in terms of reasons-based 
explanations. First, it seems clear that narratives can communicate not only connections of 
reasons and actions, but also other connections – including causal [32, p,140;38] and 
teleological connections. A purely reasons-based view of narrative’s epistemic contribution 
is overly narrow just as the purely causal view is. Second, while the reason-based view is 
intended to show that narratives can provide true knowledge, it does so by confirming a 
strong distinction between ‘causal/scientific knowledge’ and ‘narrative knowledge’. Ricoeur, 
for example, argues that narratives provide a different sort of knowledge to science, involve 
different senses of truth and certainty, and require different kinds of truth-test [36, p.22]. 
Such a strong distinction makes it difficult to reconcile the two kinds of knowledge, implying 
that ‘narrative knowledge’ cannot be assessed in the same ways as scientific knowledge. 
This view thus also fails to offer guidance on when knowledge from narratives is likely to be 




6 This aligns with a large body of work which regards the human and the physical sciences to involve 
quite different forms of knowledge, sometimes distinguished as explanation (eklären) and 
understanding (verstehen) [33, p.24-5]. 
7 It also connects to reasons many have suggested drawing on narrative to think about personal 
identity [36] and/or self-conceptions that promote flourishing, particularly in the context of 




Plural forms of contribution to knowledge 
As we have seen, there are various ways events in narratives can be connected. As well as 
causal and reasons-for-action connections, there are teleological connections, and 
connections of ‘poetic justice’.8 This suggests that the epistemic value of narrative does not 
lie solely in providing knowledge about any particular sort of connection between events 
[41]. We therefore propose a pluralist view which recognises that narratives can involve 
multiple kinds of connections between events, and can provide diverse kinds of knowledge 
about the events they describe. They can provide epistemic value of various sorts and in 
different ways. As we now explain, the central feature of what makes connections narrative 
connections is that the description of each event in the narrative is influenced by the other 
events that are included. 
   
We can begin by recognising that events can be accurately described in numerous ways. 
Descriptions may be from different perspectives, or focus on different aspects of events. 
New true descriptions of an event can also arise in light of events occurring later. Danto calls 
sentences that describe events in ways that can be considered true in virtue of later events 
‘narrative sentences’. An example is “Aristarchus anticipated in 290 BC the theory which 
Copernicus published in AD 1543”. In this example, Aristarchus’ theory can be accurately 
described as an ‘anticipation’ from AD 1543 onwards, although this would not have been a 
true description before AD 1543 [42, pp.149-59]. Narrative sentences connect events by 
describing those events in ways that are true in virtue of other, temporally distinct, events. 
 
While this means there is a potentially infinite number of true descriptions of any event, 
where an event is included in a narrative, some of its potential descriptions will be 
inappropriate because they would not make the sequence of events intelligible [43]. Koppe 
provides an example of a simple narrative:  
 
(1) The other day, my neighbor called to ask if he could borrow my car. 
(2) I gave him the keys. 
(3) The next day, he used my car to rob a bank. [43, p.104] 
 
8 Various other kinds of connection are discussed in the philosophy of literature and narratology; see 





Now assume that event (1) is also truly described by “The other day, my neighbor talked to 
me on the phone” or “On May 15, a man asked me a question” [43, p.105]. If (1) were 
replaced with these descriptions, the intelligibility of the narrative would be reduced, 
perhaps entirely removed. The acceptable ways to describe (1) are circumscribed by its 
inclusion in this narrative.  
 
Generalising from Danto’s and Koppe’s points, we understand narrative to involve the 
description of events in ways influenced by the other events in the narrative.9 That the 
events mutually influence each others’ descriptions enables us to understand why, and the 
sense in which, the interpretive judgements involved in the given descriptions are apt. This 
implies that a narrative can, in presenting us with a sequence of events, provide us with 
reasons to interpret the events in particular ways, suggested by the descriptions provided. 
By connecting Aristarchus’ theory to Copernicus’, we are given reasons to consider the 
former an anticipation, and the latter a rediscovery. Or, similarly, a narrative might provide 
reasons to regard an event as the cause of, an intentional action towards achieving, a 
hindrance to, or an expression of poetic justice in relation to, some other event. Events 
might even be ‘connected’ or juxtaposed in ways that we could think of as negative, so that 
an event is seemingly inconsistent with, or raises questions about, or is ironic in light of, 
some other event.  
 
Telling a narrative can, then, be a form of reason-giving to others, insofar as the descriptions 
offered of each event demonstrate the validity or fruitfulness of the descriptions of other 
events. This implies that narratives can provide us with new knowledge: they can 
demonstrate why events can be regarded as falling under particular descriptions, or the 
validity of the interpretive judgements involved in those descriptions. The epistemic value of 
a narrative could also thus include not only the information its descriptions provide, but 
implied directions for further attention or investigation in relation to the judgements 
involved in those descriptions. 
 
 




This pluralist conception of the kinds of knowledge offered in narratives avoids the two 
problems to which the causal and reasons-based views were liable. First, it avoids the 
narrowness charge by accepting multiple sorts of connections. Second, it avoids 
distinguishing between ‘narrative knowledge’ and other kinds of knowledge, instead 
recognising that narratives can provide knowledge about multiple sorts of connections 
between events, and offers other epistemic goods (such as guidance on directions for 
further investigation, or an invitation to consider the validity of certain interpretive 
judgements). Since on this view narratives provide knowledge of the same sort as that 
obtained in other ways, this knowledge can be assessed in familiar ways: both the 
descriptions of particular events, and the connections between events, can be assessed for 
truth against the world, just as we assess non-narrative descriptions against the world. 
Further, the account suggests some of the ways that knowledge from narratives can tend to 
go awry, and hence some areas for caution. As we discuss below, this feature is particularly 
useful for narrative approaches in healthcare. 
 
4. Resolving theoretical criticisms of the use of narrative in healthcare   
In this section we first explain how the pluralist conception of narrative avoids being too 
narrow, in relation to both the patient’s and the medical narrative. We then show it avoids 
the charge of being so broad as to be trivial by drawing out five ways in which, implicitly, 
clinical attention to narratives can be useful in improving patient care. 
 
In relation to the narrowness charge, the pluralist conception of narrative clarifies that 
where narrative approaches are used to help develop or convey understanding of illness 
experiences, they need not impose particular understandings of illness onto patients or 
constrict what are regarded as valid or beneficial forms of self-understanding. Since a 
narrative can on this view include multiple kinds of connections between events, it can 
include chaotic or inconsistent elements – for example, by describing them as inconsistent, 
difficult to understand, or apparently meaningless. Although there might be similarities 
between some patients’ illness experiences, and commonly found patterns such as 
‘recovery narratives’ or ‘transformation stories’, the pluralist conception reminds us that a 
main reason for using narrative to examine illness experience is to avoid homogenising 




the epistemic strength of narratives is that they can also contain inconsistences and 
incoherence [36, pp.141-3;161]. Attention to narrative in our pluralist sense would thus 
encourage recognition of chaotic experience rather than omitting it.10 
 
Similar points apply to the corresponding criticism that a narrative approach narrows 
possibilities in clinicians’ thinking. On the pluralist conception of narrative, elements that do 
not easily fit into the whole can be included. In medical narratives, this might involve 
connections between events like ‘symptom A is puzzling in light of test result B’ or ‘test 
result A and symptom P fit with diagnosis X. Yet test result B is unexpected in light of 
diagnosis X’. If the process of constructing a medical narrative is understood on the pluralist 
conception, then, this should actually encourage attentiveness to details that seem not to 
easily fit.  
 
The same point also gives us the first reason to think that, although the pluralist conception 
of narrative is intentionally inclusive and thus quite broad, it is not so broad as to be trivial. 
Narrative differs from other ways of understanding different events together – such as 
classifying them as instances of a category, or seeing them as parts of a recognisable pattern 
– which involve finding similarities or consistencies between them [41]. Narratives can 
pinpoint similarities and consistencies, but also dissimilarities and inconsistencies (Ricoeur’s 
“synthesis of the heterogeneous” [36, p.141]). For this reason, regarding the clinical process 
of understanding a patient’s healthcare concerns as a narrative has advantages over 
regarding it as a process of fitting the concerns into some category, or finding the pattern it 
most resembles. Such approaches would, indeed, tend to encourage omitting whatever 
details are difficult to accommodate in the category or the pattern. Thinking of the process 
as constructing a narrative on our pluralist conception, in contrast, encourages less 
distortion. Thus while the view avoids the narrowness charge, it avoids the charge of being 
so broad as to be trivial by showing what is gained in thinking of clinical procedures in 
narrative terms.  
 
10 This does not answer the criticism that some may prefer to pursue self-understanding in non-
narrative forms such as poetry or dance. Rather than expanding the notion of narrative to include 
these (which do not meet even the minimal understanding of narrative noted at the start of section 





A second advantage of the pluralist conception of narrative is that it confirms that narratives 
can represent events from particular perspectives and are thus a suitable form in which to 
explore the meaning of events to patients (though it holds that this is not their only use). 
This is what underpins claims relating to narrative being a suitable form for patients to 
develop self-understanding, and to communicate this to clinicians. Understanding of how 
things seem from the patient’s perspective might be undertaken in non-narrative forms, but 
narrative will be a relatively easy and efficient method for this purpose. Further, thinking of 
patients’ presentations as part of their individual narratives encourages clinicians to think 
about how the experiences seem to patients, and how the illness events connect to other 
events in their life, and their beliefs and attitudes.  
 
How a clinician listens to a patient can make the difference between providing care that is, 
and is not person-centred. Attending to patient narratives can help clinicians to 
acknowledge and respect patients’ experiences, in ways that communicate empathy, 
improve therapeutic relationships and avoid reducing experiences of illness and healthcare 
to their biomedical aspects.  
 
Third, the pluralist conception allows that patients’ narratives can be a source of causal 
knowledge – including of what may have contributed to their condition (e.g., lifestyle or 
lifestyle changes, recent exposure to specific infections, etc.), as well as knowledge about 
the events that caused the patient to seek advice (e.g., patients’ experiences of concern), 
which can be relevant to meeting the patient’s needs effectively. Consider the following 
example: 
 
Amita presents to her GP, concerned about a minor skin rash on the hands. The GP, whose 
appointments are running 45 minutes late, quickly moves to diagnostic mode, questioning 
her about how the rash began, its duration, associated itches or pain, recent exposures to 
allergens, and so on. Amita answers each of these questions in turn: the rash came on over 
several days following a visit to another state; yes, it is slightly uncomfortable; yes, she feels 
otherwise well; no, she is not aware of any allergies but may have been exposed to 




explaining a range of potential causes, ready to reassure Amita that there is unlikely to be 
reason to worry and that she should monitor the rash and return if it does not clear up on its 
own within two weeks. At this point Amita interjects to explain her main reason for seeking a 
consultation is that just before the rash began, she spent time with an infant relative with 
leukaemia who was at the time neutropenic. She has reported the rash to her relatives who 
discussed the matter with the children’s hospital, and been asked to have the spots checked 
for varicella so that preventative steps can be taken if the child has been exposed. The GP 
takes swabs for testing and assures the patient she will call with results as soon as possible. 
 
The point we want to make with this example is that the specific concern of this patient is 
easily accessible by listening to a brief narrative, while even the most thorough clinician 
would be unlikely to uncover this specific goal of the healthcare encounter by questions 
focusing on pathophysiological features of the rash (although a general question like “Have 
you any particular questions you'd like to ask me about the rash?” might elicit the relevant 
narrative). While clinicians’ knowledge and experience provide them with ways to anticipate 
the kinds of questions they need to ask in many cases, there will always be some limitation 
on the effectiveness and efficiency of that method, because clinicians cannot always know 
what it is they need to know. A patient’s narrative will pick out the events they take to be 
relevant, to their condition or their reasons for seeking advice. Even if the patient offers 
other events in query, or those events are subsequently accepted to be causally unrelated, 
it might still be useful to the clinician and patient to raise and discuss events the patient 
thinks could be connected to their condition, for example to ensure fears are addressed, or 
to facilitate effective treatment.  
 
Fourth, the pluralist conception of narrative provides a way of understanding the sense in 
which communication can be facilitated between patient and clinician by using narratives. 
On this view, in connecting events together in certain ways, narratives present reasons to 
interpret some event in a certain way, and invite consideration of the validity of the 
judgments involved in the offered descriptions, including consideration of how events may 
be interpreted from different perspectives. As the clinician listens to the patient’s narrative 
and the patient to the medical narrative, reasons to regard the events therein under the 




occurred prior to the onset of their complaint as potentially relevant to the eventual 
description of it; or details of their social circumstances as reasons to respond to the 
experiences in particular ways. A clinician may offer a blood glucose test result, combined 
with their knowledge of normal or desirable ranges, as reasons to understand certain 
patient experiences under the description of ‘symptoms of pre-diabetes’. On our approach, 
this can be regarded as an exchange of reasons and negotiation of descriptions of the 
events of illness, where more than one narrative description is possible. Regarding the 
exchange in this way may enable patients to re-interpret their experiences in ways that 
point to diagnosis and therapeutic responses, while regarding the process as one of 
respectful, rational and enabling exchange rather than as a matter of the clinician dismissing 
or seeing the patients’ perspective as defective or deficient and needing to be replaced or 
corrected.  
 
Finally, the pluralist conception provides guidance on areas for caution in using narratives. 
Some particular areas for caution relate to ways that narrative might mis-describe events. 
For instance, misleading descriptions can occur when an interpretation of events mistakes 
one kind of connection between events for another, such as interpreting a temporal 
connection as a causal one. For example, some vaccine-hesitant parents explain their stance 
by telling a story about a child becoming ill immediately following a vaccination. In some of 
these cases they may have witnessed a vaccine reaction; in others, while the illness may be 
causally unrelated, the parents’ interpretation of the sequence of events as causal could 
lead them to avoid later vaccinations. The narrative told by the parents can be identified as 
potentially misinterpreting the events.  Another area for caution is the possibility that a 
clinician too quickly finds some connection that appears to be explanatory, and ceases to 
search for others. Something like this seems to occur when symptoms of physical illness are 
ignored in people with mental illnesses, as the physical symptoms are taken to originate in 
their mental illness. Again, this results in a medical narrative that contains an incorrect 
interpretation of the symptom as a symptom of mental illness, which can be interrogated. 
Since our pluralist conception also implies that knowledge gained from narratives is 
continuous with other knowledge, potentially misleading narratives can be either assessed 
empirically and critically. On the pluralist conception ‘listening to narratives’ is not some 




about how both clinician and patient are interpreting events and assessment of 
interpretations in light of other knowledge. This supports exchange of narrative 
interpretations in the respectful and enabling ways associated with PCH.  
 
 
5.  Responding to practical problems    
In this section we argue that the pluralist conception of narrative provides some guidance 
regarding practical barriers relating to time constraints, patient expectations, and 
limitations on accepting patient narratives at face value.  
 
In relation to time constraints (which are of course, a reflection of economic constraints), 
our conception allows that listening to a patient’s narrative does not require a clinician to 
listen to an entire life story: the relevant story may be quite short and relatively superficial. 
This is consistent with empirical evidence showing that although clinicians may be wary of 
inviting a patient narrative for fear that this will involve indefinite listening and wading 
through many irrelevant details, this is unlikely. Langewitz et al’s classic study examined 
how long patients spontaneously speak for at the start of a consultation if uninterrupted. 
The mean talking time was 92 seconds; 78% of patients finished in under two minutes, and 
only around 2% spoke for more than five minutes [44]. Other studies report similar results 
[45,46]. Overall consultation times range between 7.6 to 17.6 minutes in European 
countries and the USA [47], so listening to this spontaneous narrative seems unlikely to take 
up ‘too much’ of the clinical consultation in most cases. 
 
Nor does it seem that patients often divert onto long, irrelevant tangents. Langewitz et al 
report that “[i]n all cases doctors felt that the patients were giving important information 
and should not be interrupted.” This suggests (but does not confirm) that allowing patients 
to direct the initial part of the consultation may be as or even more time-efficient than 
gathering the information by clinician-directed questioning.11 This is consistent with reports 
from clinicians that practicing narratively or in a patient-centred way can actually save time 
overall [2, p.668;14, p.67;18, p.1899]. On our view, a narrative approach does not mean that 
 
11 Two classic studies of how much time patients were given to speak before being interrupted by 




clinicians must spend a great amount of time listening to patients; it is more important how 
the clinician listens, interprets, and responds to the narrative or narrative fragments the 
patient offers as relevant.  
 
Similarly, listening to a patient’s story does not always require deep empathic engagement. 
Listening to what a patient offers as a narrative and considering how it relates to and might 
be responded to in the light of a medical narrative can be simply a useful method of 
collecting relevant information from the patient. Attention to narratives can also, however, 
encourage respectful and responsive attitudes in clinicians, and develop listening skills that 
can help in recognising when deeper engagement, and further exploration of the patient’s 
perspective, may be warranted [13, p.84;49]. This can occur, first, through regarding the 
information the patient provides as a narrative they are telling, with the implications this 
has for recognising their subjective perspective. A narrative may reveal specific things the 
patient seeks from a consultation, such as desires for understanding or recognition of 
suffering. Second, a change of attitude can occur through recognition that the medical 
narrative is also an interpretation, with the accompanying awareness of how it may impact 
on the patient’s understanding of their experience.  
 
The third issue relates to the fact that there are sometimes reasons for clinicians not to take 
a patient’s narrative at face value. If patients are deceiving clinicians or themselves, perhaps 
out of embarrassment or fear, not challenging their narrative (i.e. by suggesting alternative 
interpretations or configurations within it) may be remiss. It is important to recognise that 
on our account, attending to a narrative does not mean accepting it uncritically: we may 
need to be critical or sceptical of narratives, just as with other forms of evidence. Where 
concerns that a patient’s narrative is false or self-deceptive are based on good listening 
practices, on respectfully questioning but not dismissing what patients say, challenging and 
offering alternative interpretations in response to a patient’s narrative could be 
appropriate. This kind of case is likely to be difficult in practice [26], and clinicians will need 
to take into account the ongoing relationship and a range of other considerations, but our 
account suggests that engaging with these patients by suggesting a reinterpretation of their 






We have made the case for understanding narratives as accounts of events in which the way 
each event is described is influenced by the ways other events in the narrative are 
described. This view of narratives enables recognition that they can contribute knowledge 
of several different kinds of connections between events, and add further epistemic value 
by suggesting potentially useful lines of inquiry. When combined with the view that 
narrative approaches to healthcare involve considering both patients’ informational 
offerings and professional understandings as narratives, our account is able to overcome the 
major theoretical and practical criticisms that have been levelled against the use of narrative 
approaches in healthcare. In doing so, it helps explain how clinical attention to patient 
narratives could be of use in healthcare, and why and how narrative approaches are 
consistent with person-centred healthcare, potentially helping to achieve features of PCH 
such as treating patients as persons worthy of respect and compassion; recognising and 
responding to patients’ subjective experience of illness and care; and developing 
therapeutic relationships that support (or at least do not undermine) patients’ abilities to 
participate actively in their healthcare and ensuring their own values influence decision-
making. More generally, we hope to have shown that narrative approaches in PCH can 
benefit from paying attention to the epistemological as well as the ethical possibilities of 
clinical attention to narratives. 
 
Acknowledgements 
The first author was supported by the Australian Research Council (CE140100012). The third 
author was part supported by the Wellcome Trust (209811). Our thanks to participants at 
the European Society for Philosophy of Medicine and Health Care 32nd annual conference 
for comments and questions on an earlier version of some of the paper. 
 
References 
1. Morris, D.B. (2008). Narrative medicines: challenge and resistance. Permanente Journal 
12(1), 88-96. 
2. Moore, L., Britten, N., Lydahl, D., Naldemirci, O., Elam, M. & Wolf, A. (2017). Barriers and 
facilitators to the implementation of person-centred care in different healthcare 




3. Savard, J. (2013). Personalised medicine: A critique on the future of health care. Journal 
of Bioethical Inquiry 10, 197-203. 
4. Vogt, H., Hofmann, B., Getz, L. (2016). Personalized medicine: Evidence of normativity in 
its quantitative definition of health. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 37(5), 401-416. 
5. Hogarth, S. & Marks, L. (1998). The golden narrative in British medicine. In: Narrative 
based Medicine: Dialogue and Discourse in Clinical Practice (ed. T. Greenhalgh & B. 
Hurwitz), pp. 140-148. London: BMJ Books.  
6. Entwistle, V.A. & Watt, I.S. (2013). Treating patients as persons: A capabilities approach 
to support delivery of person-centred care. American Journal of Bioethics 13(8), 29-39. 
7. Buetow, S. (2016). Person-centred health care: Balancing the welfare of patients and 
clinicians. London: Routledge. 
8. Frank, A. (1995). The Wounded Storyteller: Body, Illness, and Ethics. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.  
9. Woods, A. (2010). The limits of narrative: provocations for the medical humanities. 
Medical Humanities 37, 73-78.  
10. Woods, A. (2012). Beyond the Wounded Storyteller: rethinking narrativity, illness and 
embodied self-experience. In: Health, Illness and Disease: Philosophical Essays (ed. H. 
Carel & R. Cooper), pp. 113-128. Newcastle: Acumen. 
11. McKechnie, C.C. (2014). Anxieties of communication: the limits of narrative in the 
medical humanities. BMJ Medical Humanities 40, 119-24. 
12. Conway, K. (2013). Beyond words: Illness and the limits of expression. Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press.  
13. Kalitzkuz, V. & Matthiessen, P.F. (2009). Narrative-based medicine: Potential, pitfalls, 
and practice. Permanente Journal 13(1), 80-86. 
14. Charon, R. 2006. Narrative medicine: Honoring the stories of illness. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
15. Montgomery Hunter, K. (1991). Doctor’s stories: The narrative structure of medical 
knowledge. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.  
16. Montgomery Hunter, K. (1996). Narrative, literature, and the clinical exercise of practical 




17. Greenhalgh, T. & Hurwitz, B. (1998). Why study narrative? In: Narrative based medicine: 
Dialogue and Discourse in Clinical Practice (ed. T. Greenhalgh & B. Hurwitz), pp. 3-16. 
London: BMJ Books.  
18. Charon, R. (2001). Narrative medicine: A model for empathy, reflection, profession, and 
trust. Journal of the American Medical Association 286(15), 1897-1902. 
19. Kleinman, A. (1988). The Illness Narratives: Suffering, Healing, and the Human Condition. 
New York: Basic Books. 
20. Nelson, H.L. (2001). Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair. New York: Cornell University 
Press.  
21. McNaughton, J. (1998). Anecdote in clinical practice. In: Narrative based medicine: 
Dialogue and Discourse in Clinical Practice (ed. T. Greenhalgh & B. Hurwitz), pp. 202-211. 
London: BMJ Books.  
22. Montgomery Hunter, K. (1997). Aphorisms, maxims, and old saws: narrative rationality 
and the negotiation of clinical choice. In: Stories and Their Limits (ed. H.L. Nelson), pp. 
215-231. New York: Routledge.  
23. Garden, R. (2010). Telling stories about illness and disability: The limits and lessons of 
narrative. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 52(1), 121-135. 
24. Woody, J.M. (2004). When narrative fails. Philosophy, Psychology and Psychiatry 10(4), 
329-45.  
25. Buckley, C., McCormack, B. & Ryan, A. (2017). Working in a storied way – Narrative-
based approaches to person-centred care and practice development in older adult 
residential care settings. Journal of Clinical Nursing 27, e858-72. 
26. Entwistle, V.A., Cribb, A., Watt, I.S., Skea, Z.C., Owens, J., Morgan, H.M. & Christmas, S. 
(2018). “The more you know, more you realising it is really challenging to do”: Tensions 
and uncertainties in person-centred support for people with long-term conditions. 
Patient Education and Counselling 101, 1460-7. 
27. Velleman, J.D. (2003). Narrative Explanation. Philosophical Review 112(1), 1-25. 
28. Hempel, C.G. (1942). The function of general laws in history. The Journal of Philosophy 
39(2), 35-48. 
29. Currie, G. (2006). Narrative representation of causes. Journal of Aesthetics and Art 




30. White, H.V. (1987). The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical 
Representation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.  
31. White, H.V. (1975). Historicism, history, and the figurative imagination. History and 
Theory 14(4), 48-67. 
32. Dray, W. (1957). Laws and Explanation in History. Oxford: Clarendon. 
33. Carr, D. (2008). Narrative explanation and its malcontents. History and Theory 47, 19-30. 
34. Bevir, M. (2000). Narrative as a form of explanation. Disputatio 9, 10-18. 
35. Ricoeur, P. (1992). Narrative Identity. In: On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and interpretation 
(ed. D. Wood), pp. 188-199. London: Routledge.  
36. Ricoeur, P. (1992). Oneself as Another. Trans. K. Blamey. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.  
37. Mackenzie, C. & Poltera, J. (2009). Narrative integration, fragmented selves, and 
autonomy. Hypatia 25(1), 31-54. 
38. Steuber, K.R. (2012). Understanding versus explanation? How to think about the 
distinction between the human and the natural sciences. Inquiry 55(1), 17-32. 
39. Lamarque, P. (2009). The Philosophy of Literature. Oxford: Blackwell. 
40. Klauk, T. (2016). Is there such a thing as narrative explanation? Journal of Literary Theory 
10(1), 110-138. 
41. Mink, L.O. 1970. History and fiction as modes of comprehension. New Literary History 
1(3), 541-558. 
42. Danto, A. (1985). Narration and Knowledge. New York: Columbia University Press. 
43. Koppe, T. (2016). Narrative events. StoryWorlds 6(1), 101-116. 
44. Langewitz, W., Denz, M., Keller, A., Kiss, A., Ruttimann, S. & Wossmer, B. (2002). 
Spontaneous talking time at start of consultation in outpatient clinic: Cohort study. BMJ 
325, 682-3. 
45. Blau, J.N. (1989). Time to let the patient speak. BMJ 298(6665), 39. 
46. Labaf, A., Masoomi, R. & Raeisi, M. (2015). How long it takes patients initial statement of 
concerns? Brief report. Tehran University Medical Journal 73(8), 608-13. 
47. Lussier, M.T. & Richard, C. (2006). Time to talk. Canadian Family Physician 52, 1401-2.  
48. Movaffaghi, Z., Makarem, A., Beyraghi, N., Hosseini, F. & Farsi, M. (2013). Time allowed 
to patients to explain their problem in outpatient clinics of Mashhad University of 




49. Rehmann-Sutter, C., Porz, R., & J. L. Scully.  (2012). How to relate the empirical to the 
normative: Toward a phenomenologically informed hermeneutic approach to bioethics. 
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 21(4), 436-47. 
 
 
 
